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INTRODUCTION 
Fairness seems inextricably woven into both mediation and negotiation. 
People in conflict invoke it as a sword, to bend others to their will, arguing that 
they acted fairly and the other acted unfairly. Or they raise it as a shield, ex-
plaining why they will not accede to what their counterpart is asking. It acts 
explicitly through words, and it acts tacitly through feeling. Even if no one says 
the word “fair” or “unfair,” a sense that a person has acted, or is acting, unfairly 
can elicit a negative reaction, such as anger or fear. Conversely, a sense that 
something is fair can elicit a positive reaction, such as acceptance and relief. 
Fairness is not limited to what was done or the proposed resolution. A sense of 
the fairness of the process itself is important for good outcomes.1 
The pervasiveness of fairness poses a problem for both negotiators and 
mediators. Should they seek to use it, or should they avoid talking about it? 
Some mediators have argued that moral discussions about fairness can inflame 
the parties’ antipathy towards each other and create greater distance between 
them, rather than finding common ground.2 But if moral judgments are so per-
vasive and persistent, can we really avoid them by refusing to talk about them? 
Might they still be operating implicitly in the background, affecting what eve-
ryone says, how they react, and how they decide whether to agree? 
Even what we mean by fairness remains unclear in negotiation and media-
tion. Is it what professional ethicists tell us, based on their systematic rational 
thought? Is it more a form of common sense, which people seem to have, even 
without having worked out a comprehensive moral philosophy? Is it as varied 
and idiosyncratic as the people who find themselves trying to negotiate an 
agreement or deal with a conflict? Or is there some kind of underlying structure 
                                                        
1  “[T]he fairer we feel the process is, the more satisfied we tend to be with the outcome. . . . 
[T]he fairer we feel a process is, the more willing we are to settle a dispute.” Keith G. Allred, 
Relationship Dynamics in Disputes: Replacing Contention with Cooperation, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 83, 91–92 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone 
eds., 2005); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in 
Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 473, 473–74 (2008). 
2  See, e.g., Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute Reso-
lution Practice, in BRINGING PEACE INTO THE ROOM: HOW THE PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE 
MEDIATOR IMPACT THE PROCESS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 215, 228 (Daniel Bowling & Da-
vid Hoffman eds., 2003). 
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or content to how moral judgments work in these fields? Sometimes it seems as 
if moral judgment is a kind of mysterious dark matter, which surrounds negoti-
ation and mediation, exercising some very important influence that is largely 
invisible to us and not incorporated into our theories of negotiation and media-
tion. 
Philosophy and sociology have shed quite important light on what fairness 
is and how it works. Ethicists can categorize fairness in terms of equality, equi-
ty, and need.3 We can observe each of these three distinctions operating in ne-
gotiation and mediation. Parties stuck asserting different demands and unable 
to reach agreement, for instance, might find it acceptable to “split the differ-
ence,”4 using equality as a fair solution. Alternatively, seeking to justify a 
claim, or refusing to make a further compromise, parties might assert that they 
“deserve” what they are claiming; in doing so, they are using the moral claim 
of equity. Or they may claim that they “need” an agreement to contain particu-
lar terms, meaning more than an economic need, and including the moral prin-
ciple of need. 
We know that a sense of unfairness can even displace a rational calculation 
of benefit. For example, the Ultimatum Game, which has generated an entire 
industry of interesting academic study,5 gives two people the opportunity to 
share a sum of cash, but only if they can agree on how to divide it. Logic would 
tell us that one of the recipients should be able to capture almost all of the 
available cash, ninety out of one hundred dollars, for instance, simply by refus-
ing to agree to a smaller share. The person asked to take the smaller share 
would be irrational to refuse the split, since they would be giving up a gain of 
ten dollars they would not otherwise have. Yet almost all players will reject the 
short end of such a deal. The demand is too one-sided, too unequal, and too un-
fair to be acceptable.6 
As useful as these categories may be, they only give us a general under-
standing of how moral judgment, including the judgment we recognize as fair-
ness, operates in negotiation and mediation. My project here is to explore 
whether moral psychology, and in particular the branch known as Moral Foun-
dations Theory,7 can provide a fuller insight into how fairness works on the 
                                                        
3  Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 223, 238–39 (1993). 
4  E.g., DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 281–82 (2d 
ed. 2012). 
5  The industry is not insubstantial. One recent study reports that a search for “ultimatum 
bargaining” on Google Scholar produces “more than 26,500 results.” Werner Güth & Martin 
G. Kocher, More Than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Varia-
tions, and a Survey of the Recent Literature, 108 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 396, 396 (2014). 
6  Offers to provide the respondent with 40–50 percent of the available funds are the ones 
most frequently made and are almost always accepted. Offers to provide the respondent with 
less than 20 percent of the available funds are almost always rejected. Id. at 398. Studies of 
the game have included a huge number of variables, such as gender, experience, age, culture, 
rule variations, and even testosterone levels. Id. at 403. 
7  Moral Foundations Theory has been developed by psychologist Jonathan Haidt and his 
colleagues, who have noticed that when people were questioned about certain situations that 
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ground, day to day, in mediation and negotiation. Moral Foundations Theory 
offers a particularly suggestive way for thinking about these issues. First, it is 
an account of how people react and feel, not just how they use reason or rheto-
ric; thus, it may offer a more revealing conceptual tool than “fairness” in gen-
eral. Second, it treats moral judgment as a foundational process, thereby sug-
gesting that “fairness” operates pervasively in conflict situations, not only when 
it is explicitly invoked. Rather than being something that only pops into the 
open in episodic and unpredictable ways, moral judgment may be a constant 
and more structured part of the dynamics of mediation and negotiation. Third, 
Moral Foundations Theory depicts moral judgments as largely intuitive. They 
arise effortlessly, automatically, and unconsciously, rather than through a pro-
cess of reasoning and argument. This, too, could make them more pervasive 
than a more traditional account of moral judgment might suggest. Finally, Mor-
al Foundations Theory asserts a plural account of moral judgment, not a singu-
lar one. Moral judgment is not limited to “fairness” or “justice,” but contains 
five or six different modules, or kinds of moral judgments. This range may give 
mediators and negotiators a more powerful tool to understand the operation of 
moral judgments, and to work with them to achieve their goals. 
In Part I, I will introduce Moral Foundations Theory by describing an act-
ed-out mediation conducted by two different mediators with two different out-
comes. Moral judgments help to explain the different outcomes.8 Part II pro-
vides some examples of real mediations and negotiations, as well as some parts 
of negotiation theory itself, that support the claim that Moral Foundations The-
ory explains some of the dynamics of mediation and negotiation. In Part III, I 
will discuss some of the objections to Moral Foundations Theory, and consider 
whether they negate its usefulness for mediators and negotiators. Part IV dis-
cusses the opportunities and challenges that Moral Foundations Theory pro-
vides for mediators and negotiators. It can be a powerful tool for mediators and 
negotiators to wield influence over the participants or negotiation counterparts, 
but it also gives a more prominent, and unavoidable, role for a mediator’s or 
negotiator’s own intuitive moral judgments. 
                                                                                                                                
had moral implications (some involving incest, eating pets, hitting one’s father, and so on), 
they tended to make judgments in certain patterns. The patterns developed into the account 
of six moral modules, described below. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY 
GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 124–25, 128–54 (2012); see also Jes-
se Graham et al., Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism, 47 
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 55, 61–71 (2013). 
8  The mediation had two different outcomes because it was it was simulated twice, with two 
different mediators. Despite being simulated, the mediations had a strong similarity to real 
mediations because they were unscripted, with actors improvising the parts of the disputants, 
and were conducted by experienced mediators who were instructed to handle the mediations 
as they normally do. Both versions were videotaped, and the transcripts give us the detail 
necessary to identify the operation of moral judgments in the different courses the media-
tions took. DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: 
TEACHER’S MANUAL E-2 to -50 (2008) [hereinafter FRENKEL & STARK, TEACHER’S MANUAL] 
(transcripts of Craig Lord as mediator and Cheryl Cutrona as mediator). 
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I. AN EXAMPLE OF MORAL JUDGMENT IN A MEDIATION AND  
THE PROMISE OF MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY 
A. An Example 
For their instructional book about mediation, The Practice of Mediation, 
Douglas Frenkel and James Stark created and videotaped unscripted mediation 
sessions.9 Actors played the disputing parties, but the mediators were experi-
enced professionals handling the dispute as they would real disputes, and the 
lawyers for the disputing parties were experienced lawyers. The different medi-
ators used different mediation styles and, sometimes, achieved different out-
comes. 
The matter of Bernice Wilson and Frank DiLorenzo reached very different 
results in its two different mediations. Bernice, a homeowner, had brought a 
claim against Frank’s kitchen remodeling company because Frank had aban-
doned the remodeling of Bernice’s kitchen in the middle of the job. Bernice’s 
kitchen had been demolished already and remained unusable, and Bernice be-
lieved that Frank’s company had used inferior cabinets. The conflict was ag-
gravated by the fact that Frank never responded to Bernice’s complaints. When 
mediated by Craig Lord, the parties agreed to settle with Frank paying some 
money to Bernice, in exchange for Bernice dropping her claim. She would use 
the money to have the work completed by someone else. In the other media-
tion, however, conducted by Cheryl Cutrona, the matter was resolved by Frank 
agreeing to return to the job and complete the work, with a financial adjustment 
for the delay, plus some additional terms. 
What might have contributed to these different results? Mediators are in-
tensely interested in isolating the specific factors associated with such different 
outcomes. Many, if not most, people expect a mediation to result in a compro-
mised financial settlement, as in the Craig Lord mediation. The parties make 
settlement demands and offers, negotiate competitively, reassess their options, 
and make compromises in their asserted settlement positions. Resuming and 
completing the work, however, as in the resolution of Cheryl Cutrona’s media-
tion, seems particularly attractive; it satisfies the parties’ real world needs and 
interests more directly than the payment of settlement money can. Bernice will 
get her kitchen, and Frank will, to a degree, salvage his reputation. The result 
may have been more financially efficient than the simple exchange of money; 
Frank can provide the completion services at his cost, which is less expensive 
than the cash Bernice would probably have to pay someone else for the equiva-
lent work. The agreement also repairs the relationship that was broken when 
Frank stopped working or responding to Bernice’s calls. Many argue10 that me-
                                                        
9  FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 4. 
10  E.g., GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: MEDIATION 
THROUGH UNDERSTANDING, at xxxiii (2008); BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF 
CONFLICT: A GUIDE TO ENGAGEMENT AND INTERVENTION 224–31, 294–96 (2d ed. 2012); 
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diation is particularly valuable because it can satisfy underlying needs and real 
world interests, not just legal claims, repair some broken relationships, and en-
hance mutual understanding. Additionally, mediation can do so in a more eco-
nomically efficient way than adjudication by both reducing the costs otherwise 
required to prepare for and conduct trials and developing terms of agreement 
that create more value for each participant and the situation as a whole, com-
pared to a simple numerical compromise. 
The videos and transcripts of the two mediations involving homeowner 
Bernice and contractor Frank reveal many differences between the two versions 
of the mediation. For instance, mediator Craig Lord paid extended attention to 
the financial claims and the legal strengths of the parties’ claims.11 Mediator 
Cheryl Cutrona, however, spoke hardly at all about such matters. Instead, she 
spent time trying to learn from Frank why the work had stopped and the extent 
of his concern about his reputation.12 While Lord tried to elicit positional con-
cessions in the demands and offers of each party, Cutrona sought other ideas 
for a solution from the parties themselves. Cutrona used a version of brain-
storming by asking the parties to generate a list of desired outcomes, not lim-
ited to the payment of money.13 Cutrona also appeared to pay more attention to 
how the parties felt about the events, using reflective listening by briefly sum-
marizing back what she had heard about what they said and how they felt.14 
All of these differences may help account for the difference in results. 
Much mediation and negotiation literature emphasizes the importance of learn-
ing about needs and interests of the disputants in making resolutions more in-
terest-based and more relationship-enhancing. But I would like to focus on a 
difference that I think is even more critical. 
                                                                                                                                
CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING 
CONFLICT 77 (3d ed. 2003) (“One of the mediator’s major contributions to the dispute resolu-
tion process is assisting the negotiators in making a transition from positional to interest-
based bargaining.”); JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA P. LOVE, THE MIDDLE VOICE: MEDIATING 
CONFLICT SUCCESSFULLY (2d ed. 2013). 
11  FRENKEL & STARK, TEACHER’S MANUAL, supra note 8, at E-12 to -13 (statements by me-
diator Lord in private caucus with plaintiff Bernice included: “And you have to keep as ob-
jective as you possibly can. . . . [Too much extraneous material] will lessen your credibility. 
. . . I don’t think [the condition of the kitchen is] something that the court is really going to 
put stock in.”); id. at E-17. In private caucus with defendant Frank, mediator Lord stated: 
“Unfair Trade Practices Act makes failure to comply with the contract provision a per se 
violation. . . . [The court could also award] attorney’s fees . . . or punitive damages.” Id. 
12  Id. at E-36 (statement by mediator Cutrona in private caucus to defendant Frank: “Sounds 
like she said that she was telling her friends, her people at church all about her situation. Are 
you concerned at all about your reputation?”). By way of contrast, when Frank raised his 
concern about reputation in private caucus with mediator Lord (“I have a good reputation in 
the city and I want to keep it”), the mediator did not pick up on the topic but raised a differ-
ent issue: “Let me just ask . . . about . . . the linoleum . . . .”. Id. at E-17 to -18. 
13  Id. at E-42. 
14  See, e.g., id. at E-31 (statement by mediator Cutrona: “Ok, so it sounds like what I hear 
you saying is that you’ve been frustrated because you anticipated that this was only going to 
take . . . a couple of weeks”). 
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For me, the crucial moment in the Cutrona mediation came when Bernice 
learned why Frank had not responded to her phone calls. One of Bernice’s great 
frustrations in the situation was her inability to find out the reasons for the de-
lay in completing the kitchen. She telephoned Frank’s office repeatedly but got 
no response. She likely concluded from the silence that Frank was a scamming 
her, getting her to sign the remodeling contract, taking her money, and then 
failing to do the work. In fact, according to Frank, the failure to return her tele-
phone calls came about because Connie, the person in his office responsible for 
fielding calls, avoided conflict and did not want to respond. She was not doing 
her job very well, but he was reluctant to blame her. She had been with the 
company from the time his father started it, and he thought of her as “family.” 
At mediator Cutrona’s suggestion, Frank told Bernice why her calls had 
been met with silence: 
Frank: “. . . I have a loyalty to [Connie and Sam, another employee] . . . . I’m 
never going to fire them. . . . I love them like they are my uncle and 
my aunt . . . .” 
Bernice: “I understand that [reason] and respect that because they are family.” 
Frank: “. . . not literally family . . .” 
Bernice: “But still.” 
Frank: “But they are family to me.” 
Bernice: “Yes.”15 
Bernice accepted the family-like relationship as an understandable reason 
why Frank would not have taken action to make his office more responsive to 
customer complaints. 
That understanding appears to have been crucial in permitting Bernice to 
agree to let Frank complete the job. She needed to trust him. Learning the rea-
son for the silence repaired some of the trust that Frank had lost when the work 
stopped.16 
This exchange was an excellent example of “perspective taking.”17 Dealing 
with a dispute is easier if each party can understand the situation from the per-
spective of the other.18 But I would suggest that this event is even more im-
portant than perspective taking. The fact that it was about loyalty is what makes 
the exchange so powerful and most likely instrumental in bringing Bernice and 
Frank to a better resolution. 
                                                        
15  Id. at E-48 to -49 (emphasis added). 
16  Under Cheryl Cutrona’s guidance, the mediation also developed additional ways for Ber-
nice to develop trust for Frank. Cutrona had Bernice and Frank brainstorm possible out-
comes, thus giving Bernice space to talk without rejection by Frank. Cutrona also made sure 
that the agreement by which Frank would complete the job had a damages clause for delay, 
to give him a financial incentive to complete on time. Id. at E-42, E-48 to -49. 
17  ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN 
DEALS AND DISPUTES 47 (2000). 
18  See James H. Stark & Douglas N. Frenkel, Changing Minds: The Work of Mediators and 
Empirical Studies of Persuasion, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 263, 273–74 (2013) (de-
scribing how having a party to a mediation articulate the situation as the opposing party sees 
it can moderate the first party’s views and facilitate reaching agreement). 
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In acknowledging why Frank went easy on Connie, Bernice was making a 
moral judgment. Being loyal to your group or family is a good thing to do. 
Contrast this with the moral quality of Frank’s actions as Bernice had originally 
understood them. Frank had made her a promise and then failed to keep it. In 
her eyes, he had cheated her. Furthermore, so long as her kitchen remained un-
usable, Frank’s inaction was harming her. He was not caring for her, as he had 
promised to do. Frank’s failure to respond to her repeated calls merely ampli-
fied her perception that he was cheating and harming her. But his loyalty to his 
“family” provided a positive moral counterweight to these moral transgres-
sions. It helped to neutralize the adverse moral meaning of his inaction and 
opened the door to trust. 
My argument is that this moral transition—from cheating and harming to 
loyalty to family—was the critical transition of the Bernice-Frank mediation, 
allowing them to move from hostile opposition and reluctant compromise to the 
creation of a better, mutually valuable solution. It was a transition lacking in 
the Craig Lord mediation. 
This moral transition can be understood in terms of Moral Foundations 
Theory (“MFT”). In the view of psychologist Jonathan Haidt and his col-
leagues, all humans share a set of fundamental moral reactions and judg-
ments.19 The set is limited—Haidt currently identifies only six. They are foun-
dational: specific moral reactions that we feel or express are built on them. 
They are universal, shared by all people, even if situation-specific moral judg-
ments vary across cultures, sub-cultures, and individuals. 
The fundamental moral reactions are best understood as dyads. Each is a 
kind of spectrum running from morally good to morally bad. People make mor-
al judgments along these continuums. 
The six moral dyads are: 
1. Fairness/Cheating 
2. Care/Harm 
3. Loyalty/Betrayal 
4. Authority/Subversion 
5. Sanctity/Degradation 
6. Liberty/Oppression20 
You can see that these are not moral rules or principles as we commonly 
understand and use them. They are not rules that tell us whether a particular ac-
tion in a particular circumstance is right or wrong. They are not specific guides 
to behavior. Instead, they provide a more general structure within which specif-
ic moral claims are made and debated. Whether a particular action is fair, 
whether it imposes morally wrong harm, whether it marks betrayal, and so on, 
varies across different cultures, different communities, and even different indi-
                                                        
19  HAIDT, supra note 7, at 124. 
20  Haidt and his colleagues began with the first five, and have more recently added the sixth. 
Id. at 125, 170. 
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viduals. The specifics can be endlessly debated. But, Haidt argues, all the spe-
cific moral judgments occur as part of this more fundamental moral structure. 
This account helps us to understand what happened in the Bernice-Frank 
mediation. Bernice brought to the mediation the moral judgment that Frank was 
cheating and harming her. She may have also been reacting with a sense of his 
disloyalty to her. His promise to renovate the kitchen created a kind of relation-
ship between them that put him under a moral obligation to loyally follow 
through. His “disloyal” failure to follow through added to the moral aversion 
entailed in cheating and harm. But when Bernice learned that the frustrating si-
lence in response to her complaints arose from Frank’s loyalty to Connie and 
Sam, the moral picture became more mixed. His loyalty to them helped miti-
gate Bernice’s sense that he was disloyal to her, or cheating or harming her. 
Frank may also be understood to be enacting the moral virtue of authority. 
In MFT, authority does not simply mean the power to command others. It in-
cludes an obligation to behave with appropriate care for the people over whom 
authority is held.21 Frank’s exhibition of proper authority could enhance Ber-
nice’s perception that he was also loyal and caring to Connie and Sam. 
Frank’s positive moral stance toward Connie and Sam did not directly ben-
efit Bernice. Bernice was only an observer of Frank’s moral action, not an im-
mediate beneficiary. Nevertheless, actions can be appreciated as morally good, 
and evoke a favorable response, even when they are not directed at the person 
making the moral judgment. Under Haidt’s theory, moral judgments function as 
a kind of social binder even for people who are not directly involved in doing 
morally good or bad things to each other. Gossip is one of the ubiquitous activi-
ties through which people bind themselves into social groups and try to influ-
ence others in the direction of proper behavior.22 Frank became more morally 
acceptable to Bernice, and thus, more trustworthy in her eyes, because of how 
he acted toward Connie and Sam, negating some of her ill feelings based on 
how he acted toward her. 
B. The Promise of Moral Foundations Theory 
Several of the characteristics of MFT make it particularly attractive as a 
way to understand the shift in Bernice’s stance toward Frank. First, the moral 
judgments are intuitive. They come to Bernice, and to all of us, automatically 
and without conscious attention or effort. Bernice did not have to explicitly rea-
                                                        
21  This account of authority draws on the theory of social relations developed by Alan Page 
Fiske, in which the authority/subordinate relationship is one of the fundamental ways in 
which people organize their relationships. ALAN PAGE FISKE, STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL LIFE: 
THE FOUR ELEMENTARY FORMS OF HUMAN RELATIONS 13–14 (1991). 
22  HAIDT, supra note 7, at 171; Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund, Social Intuitionists An-
swer Six Questions About Moral Psychology, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE COGNITIVE 
SCIENCE OF MORALITY: INTUITION AND DIVERSITY 181, 190 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 
2008) (“People love to talk about moral questions and violations, and one of the main topics 
of gossip is the moral and personal failings of other people.”). 
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son her way from thinking that Frank was bad to thinking that he was also, in 
some real sense, good. We do not see her laboring over her moral judgment 
about Frank. She just knew it, quickly. In the grand debates over whether moral 
judgment is largely intuitive, or only worth its salt if justified by conscious rea-
soning, MFT is decidedly in the intuitive camp.23 
Second, MFT is a plural theory of moral judgment. Moral judgment is not 
limited to a single, master concept of fairness or judgment, but incorporates 
several different moral modules. This multiplicity makes it easier to understand 
how Bernice’s moral judgment of Frank could shift. She did not have to aban-
don her judgment that Frank had cheated her by stopping work, or had harmed 
her, or had become disloyal to her. She could add to those intuitive moral 
judgments her equally intuitive understanding that he was loyal to Connie and 
Sam, cared for them, and was exercising proper authority with regard to them. 
If moral judgments were limited to a single metric, then people making them 
would be caught in a win-lose dilemma. One must either hold on to the moral 
conclusion, or give it up. And it is difficult to give things up.24 The multiplicity 
of moral modules described by MFT provides a way to ameliorate the stark 
conflict. The force of the moral aversion in one module (such as harm) is less-
ened by a positive moral judgment in one of the other modules (such as loyal-
ty). 
Third, these moral modules are foundational. Under this approach, all mor-
al reactions are built on one or more of them. They are in the background of all 
the specific moral reactions and judgments people actually experience and ar-
ticulate. Even if Bernice does not express her disapproval and anger towards 
Frank in the explicit terms of the modules, the foundational characteristic of the 
modules means they underlie and animate the explicit critical arguments and 
feelings that Bernice voices. Similarly, we can understand that loyalty is a 
foundational aspect underlying the specific thought—“family”—that Bernice 
voiced in showing that Frank had also done a good thing.25 
Fourth, moral judgments as described in MFT are linked to emotional re-
sponses. People tend to prescribe moral virtues on the “good” side of each 
                                                        
23  As between Plato (reason) and Hume (sentiment), Haidt comes down on the side of 
Hume. E.g., HAIDT, supra note 7, at 41; see also Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its 
Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 
814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, The Emotional Dog]. 
24  In psychological terms, both the need to maintain consistency, and the aversion to loss, 
which is more painful than a comparable gain, make giving up difficult regardless of the log-
ical force of any reasoned arguments in favor of changing your mind. See ROBERT B. 
CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 57 (rev. ed. 2009) (regarding the 
question of consistency); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 282–86 (2011) (re-
garding loss aversion). 
25  One of Haidt’s interesting findings is that the different moral modules have differing sali-
ence for people who are politically liberal and those who are politically conservative. Ameri-
can liberals tend to react strongly in the Fairness and Caring modules, but seem rather numb 
on the Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity scales. Conservatives’ moral judgments are more 
evenly spread across all the modules. HAIDT, supra note 7, at 155–88. 
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scale, feel good about them, and find themselves attracted to people who exhib-
it them. But people proscribe the moral vices on the “bad” side of each scale. 
We feel bad about them and seek to avoid both the action and the person. Ne-
gotiation and mediation are more likely to be successful when the participants 
feel good (or at least not so bad) about each other. MFT posits that identifying 
and eliciting the good moral judgments can facilitate both negotiation and me-
diation. 
Finally, MFT is attractive for the project of understanding moral judgment 
in negotiation and mediation because it identifies only a few modules. Unfair-
ness and blameworthiness, as individual people experience it in conflict, can be 
as idiosyncratic as the people involved and as variable as snowflakes. It might 
seem a fool’s errand to try to identify and chase down all the specifics of a 
broad claim of unfairness. MFT, however, tells us that if we look past specific 
expressions of unfairness, we will find no more than five or six modules. 
II. MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY IN THE REAL WORLD 
Identifying a moral turning point in the Bernice Wilson-Frank DiLorenzo 
mediation does not establish that similar moral judgments exist in the world of 
real conflicts. Although many observers would find the Wilson-DiLorenzo me-
diation credible,26 it was still “acted” and thus might not exemplify what hap-
pens to people enmeshed in their own very real conflicts. Examples from the 
real world are not easy to locate because we do not have access to the minute-
by-minute exchanges of words, feelings, and actions that are needed to see intu-
itive moral judgments in action. Most mediations are private and confidential.27 
We do not have an adequate database to study with the needed detail. 
Nevertheless, both mediation and negotiation stories, and even some nego-
tiation theory, suggest that moral judgment in general, and the moral categories 
of MFT in particular, function widely in mediation and negotiation. Readers 
who have experience in mediation might review their own experiences to find 
examples. 
                                                        
26  This is far from a universal reaction. Several readers have found it completely unbelieva-
ble that someone whose life was so hurtfully disrupted by Frank’s unexplained disappear-
ance would ever let him back in the house. Many mediations will be characterized by antag-
onistic anger that never abates, even if the dispute is resolved by some compromise of 
settlement positions. But mediators (and others) usually will have at least some experiences 
in which initial antipathy somehow changes to greater mutual understanding and successful 
problem solving. Our task here is to explore whether MFT can help us account for such 
changes, and perhaps bring about more of them. 
27  Statements made in a negotiation or mediation arising from an effort to settle a lawsuit are 
privileged to a degree by Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and its state analogues, preventing 
the use of settlement statements to prove or disprove liability. Statements made in mediation, 
regardless of whether the mediation is to settle a lawsuit, may be privileged by virtue of Sec-
tion 4 of the Uniform Mediation Act and similar state provisions. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4 
(2003). Parties to a mediation may also agree to keep their mediation statements confiden-
tial, and the Uniform Mediation Act affirms the validity of such agreements. Id. § 8. 
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A. Mediation Stories 
A purse-snatching: Malcolm Gladwell recounts in recorded detail a media-
tion between a purse-snatcher and his victim, videotaped in England.28 The 
mediation began in a distant, hostile manner, but it changed when the purse-
snatcher began to reveal information about his own family, his child, and his 
dire financial straits. We might understand the shift in tone and content as fol-
lows: in the eyes of the victim, the purse-snatcher had committed the moral 
transgression of harming her (harm/care). The information about the purse-
snatcher’s family introduced some new moral dimensions into the discussion. 
Rather than seeing the offender as merely a harmer, the victim could also begin 
to see him as caring (for his child). In addition, in acting to protect his own 
family, even if he broke the law to do it, the offender was exhibiting loyalty to 
others, a moral good (loyalty/betrayal). The victim ended up even showing 
some care and concern for her robber’s situation. 
A disputed mechanical repair: Another possible example comes from a 
mediation in small claims court handled by one of my mediation course stu-
dents. The dispute was between the owner of a motorcycle and the shop that 
had installed loudspeakers in it. The loudspeaker mountings had rusted, and the 
motorcycle owner blamed the shop. The student mediator, as he reported it, 
tried many of the standard interventions to find terms on which the parties 
could agree. He tried to reduce each party’s confidence that they would win the 
case if they could not settle, communicating that facts are always uncertain, and 
one cannot easily predict what the judge will decide. The shop owner would not 
budge. The student mediator tried to find aspects of value beyond the dollar 
amounts at issue by reminding the owner that a reputation for good customer 
service is quite valuable for a business, and a contrary reputation for treating 
customers poorly is bad. Still no movement. Then the conversation came 
around to the fact that the customer was a friend of the shop owner’s son. The 
owner changed his position, and the parties reached agreement!29 
This account has several layers of hearsay in it, and we lack the detail to 
confidently draw a conclusion about what happened. To me, however, it seems 
quite plausible that highlighting the relationship between the customer and the 
owner’s son elicited a new moral response. Prior to that, the parties had been 
engaged in trading moral claims about fairness and harm. Each probably 
thought the other had acted unfairly: in the shop owner’s eyes, the customer 
had paid for work done and was now “cheating” by asking for money back, and 
in the customer’s eyes, the shop owner had “cheated” by not doing work of the 
quality that had been implicitly promised. On top of that, on the care/harm 
spectrum, each saw the other as trying to harm him. The introduction of the 
                                                        
28  Malcolm Gladwell, Here’s Why: A Sociologist Offers an Anatomy of Explanations, NEW 
YORKER, April 10, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10 
/heres-why/. 
29  Notes of student description on file with author. 
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family relationship allowed the parties to shift to a different moral spectrum. It 
is a moral good for a father to be loyal to the members of his family (loyal-
ty/betrayal). By focusing on the relationship between the customer and the 
owner’s son, the customer could be brought within the ambit of the group for 
whom loyalty was a moral good. 
It is also possible that some of the authority/subversion spectrum was elic-
ited. Fathers have authority in their families. With this authority comes some 
obligation to care for those over whom authority is exercised. Once the moral 
good of recognizing and exercising authority came to the fore, it became moral-
ly more appropriate for the shop owner to show some care to the customer who 
was connected with his son. 
The lawyer’s advice: Mediator Dwight Golann describes saving a media-
tion by having a party’s lawyer meet privately with the opposing party and his 
lawyer. Settlement efforts were getting nowhere; the creditor thoroughly mis-
trusted the debtor because the debtor had stopped payments when the dispute 
arose. Golann, as the mediator, discovered that the debtor had stopped paying 
on the advice of his lawyer. He arranged for the debtor’s lawyer to explain to 
the creditor that the cessation of payments had been on his advice, and not the 
result of the debtor’s own decision. Suddenly, in the eyes of the creditor, the 
debtor went from the moral wrongs of cheating (fairness/cheating) and harming 
(care/harm) to someone who was complying with the authority of his lawyer 
(authority/subversion.) The matter was subsequently resolved.30 
The terminated marine: Mediator David Hoffman tells the story of a for-
mer marine who, upset by his employer’s practice of cutting corners and bend-
ing rules, became a whistle-blower and was fired. During the mediation, the 
marine came to understand that the employer did not treat rules, goals, and 
practices in the same clear and direct manner as the military did, and it was bet-
ter for him to move on. While we lack many details of the people and the medi-
ation, I suspect that differing views of authority was one of the factors driving 
the conflict between the company and the marine. Under MFT, a perception 
that authority is being abused can elicit a negative moral judgment. The ma-
rine’s condemnation of the company’s practices may have arisen from his sense 
that his colleagues and superiors were subverting proper authority. Resolution 
became possible when he realized that the company had a different view of au-
thority, one that he did not wish to be part of.31 
A transgender dispute: Russell Brunson tells the story of a conflict that 
arose from the adamant refusal of one resident of a housing complex to refer to 
a transgendered neighbor by the latter’s new female gender, or to engage with 
her about arranging for community tasks that involved both of them. I think we 
can plausibly understand that the conflict rested, at least in part, on one resi-
                                                        
30  DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR NEUTRALS 
AND ADVOCATES 74 (2009). 
31  David A. Hoffman, The Whistle-Blower: Mediating an Employment Termination Dispute, 
in STORIES MEDIATORS TELL 141 (Eric R. Galton & Lela P. Love eds., 2012). 
972 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:959  
dent’s moral judgment that his transgendered neighbor was, in the sancti-
ty/degradation module, degraded, while in the other resident’s judgment, she 
was being oppressed (liberty/oppression).32 
B. Negotiation Stories 
Negotiation to create value and invent options for mutual gain: Many con-
flict theorists have urged negotiators to adopt a value-creating approach to me-
diation.33 I think the approach is attractive because it has a positive moral con-
notation, above and beyond the tangible economic value it might add to an 
agreement. Using this approach, the negotiators, who are to various degrees 
opposed to each other and seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
other, have now begun to care for their counterparts. The method shows that it 
is possible to be self-interested and still care for the other. The moral power of 
the care/harm module has been elicited. 
We might even recast the famous argument against positional, distributive 
negotiation, and in favor of interest-based, value-creating negotiation, in terms 
of MFT. In Getting to YES, Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton point 
out that people who negotiate in a positional, distributive way face a dilemma 
between “hard” and “soft” negotiating.34 Act too hard, by demanding too much 
and conceding too little, and one runs the risk of losing any agreement and poi-
soning relationships. Act too soft, being “nice” by giving concessions for the 
sake of harmony and a better relationship, and one may be taken advantage of. 
In the framework of MFT, acting too hard is a way to avoid being cheated, to 
protect the fairness of the exchange. But the cost of insisting on fairness is to 
put aside care for the counterpart and run the risk of harming them. Acting too 
soft is a form of caring for the counterpart, but at the cost of suffering from 
cheating at their hands. The path around that dilemma—focusing on interests 
rather than positions to invent options for mutual gain35—allows one to exhibit 
                                                        
32  Russell Brunson, Becoming a Believer, in STORIES MEDIATORS TELL, supra note 31, at 
193. Through the mediation, including an apology, the co-residents were able to agree to 
more respectful treatment and better methods to deal with issues in their common housing 
complex. 
33  The term “value-creating” refers to negotiators’ efforts to restructure an agreement so one 
participant gets more value from the new terms without subtracting any value from the other. 
It is most clearly set out in DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS 
NEGOTIATOR 88–116 (1986), and it pervades work such as ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY 
WITH BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 58–
81 (3rd ed. 2011) (“invent options for mutual gain”) and WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO: 
NEGOTIATING WITH DIFFICULT PEOPLE (1991). It is equally pervasive in mediation theory. See 
sources cited supra note 10. Mediators who can help one or both participants achieve a better 
outcome without diminishing value for the others have substantially increased the likelihood 
of a resolution. These mediators have also helped the participants do substantively better 
than they might have done without the mediator’s intervention. 
34  FISHER ET AL., supra note 33, at 9, 13. 
35  Id. 
Spring 2015] BEYOND FAIRNESS 973 
some care for the counterpart, while at the same time insisting on what is fair 
and avoiding being cheated. 
Managing emotions in negotiation: We can also see shadows of the moral 
judgment modules in Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro’s guide for managing 
emotions in negotiation.36 Fisher and Shapiro set out five precepts to elicit posi-
tive emotions and to mitigate the negative emotions that often accompany con-
flict37: show appreciation of your counterpart, find affiliations with her, honor 
her autonomy, recognize her status, and adopt a role that is personally ful-
filling.38 Three of these precepts—affiliation, autonomy, and status—appear 
directly linked to the MFT moral judgment modules. Finding commonalities 
with your negotiation counterparts and treating them as colleagues—
affiliation—is a way to highlight group connection and group loyalty, in the 
loyalty/betrayal module.39 Autonomy—emphasizing the freedom of your coun-
terpart to decide important matters—would seem to be a form of the liber-
ty/oppression module. Status—giving your counterpart full recognition of 
whatever status is deserved—connotes the authority/subversion module. Show-
ing appreciation might even be an instance of caring, although it does not imply 
bestowing a tangible benefit or assistance. Perhaps it would not be too strong to 
say that the Fisher/Shapiro precepts are a kind of field guide for MFT. 
As an example of how the precepts might operate in the context of Fish-
er/Shapiro negotiation, imagine that a plaintiffs’ lawyer in a class action has the 
opportunity to meet with the officers of the defendant company who have au-
thority to settle the matter.40 How should she approach them? Should she play 
hardball? Or would she be well advised to follow the Fisher/Shapiro precepts, 
seeking affiliation, recognizing her counterpart’s autonomy and status? (Note 
that using the Fisher/Shapiro precepts does not mean compromising her goals, 
her focus on satisfying her clients’ interests, or her bargaining limits, which she 
should craft by a clear-headed analysis of the promise and risks of continued 
litigation. Fisher and Shapiro urge us to use the precepts to the maximum extent 
it is feasible to do so without giving up on goals, interests, and limits.41) Let’s 
assume that we would advise her to use the precepts. 
Why should they be helpful? I suggest they have impact precisely because 
they address the intuitive moral judgments that are flowing through the encoun-
                                                        
36  ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU 
NEGOTIATE (2005). 
37  Id. at 16–21. 
38  Id. at 17. 
39  Henri Tajfel’s classic experiment with groups of boys showed that affiliation among 
group members leads to more cooperative and more valuable agreements. Henri Tajfel, Ex-
periments in Intergroup Discrimination, SCI. AM., Nov. 1970, at 96, 99–102. 
40  My thanks to my colleague Douglas Eakeley for suggesting the class action settlement 
negotiation as a place to examine the role of Moral Foundations Theory. The argument that 
the Fisher and Shapiro approach is valuable in such a situation is mine, which he may not 
necessarily share. 
41  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 36, at 37. 
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ter. I suspect that the company managers will not only be resisting the demands 
of the plaintiff-class lawyer in order to save the company money. They may see 
the class claim as unfair. Using MFT, we can extract the intuitive moral judg-
ments that lie beneath a sense of unfairness. Certainly the class claim threatens 
to harm the company, and their management of the company, eliciting the 
care/harm module. It may also invoke the fairness/cheating module because the 
class lawyer is seeking payment that neither she nor the class appears to de-
serve.42 Even if the defendants arguably (but not conclusively) violated some 
aspect of the law, they may feel that they deserve to keep their money. Perhaps 
they believe that they were only operating according to the “rules” of competi-
tive business as actually practiced and were under no obligation to follow the 
“technical letter of the law.” These intuitive moral judgments strengthen the de-
fendant-managers’ resistance. Among other things, they will make it easier for 
the defendant-managers to believe that their defense is stronger than it is,43 and 
that the class lawyer’s claim is greedy and unreasonable. 
Affiliation, autonomy, and status can counteract these negative moral 
judgments much in the same way that the introduction of care and loyalty into 
the Wilson-DiLorenzo matter ameliorated Bernice’s judgment that Frank was 
cheating and harming her. By searching for some affiliation with the defendant-
managers, class counsel may elicit the group loyalty pole of the loyalty/betrayal 
module. Demonstrating respect for the defendant-manager’s autonomy and sta-
tus may bring out the positive authority pole of the authority/subversion mod-
ule. If class counsel can thus reduce the intensity of the defendant-managers’ 
feelings of cheating and harm, it may be easier for the defendant-managers to 
think more clearly about the risks of the matter, see the situation more objec-
tively, and search for creative solutions that preserve important company (and 
personal) interests, while also satisfying different interests of the class lawyer 
and the class. 
While the Fisher/Shapiro precepts are designed for negotiation, they work 
equally well for mediation. We could easily give the same advice to a mediator 
trying to resolve the class action matter that we would give to the class lawyer. 
Actually, unlike a negotiator, a mediator faces the challenge of using the Fish-
er/Shapiro precepts along several dimensions at the same time. A mediator is 
always in negotiation with the participants (both parties and lawyers), seeking 
to persuade them to engage in the process in the way the mediator thinks is 
best. Highlighting the mediator’s affiliation with the participants, and honoring 
                                                        
42  Haidt notes that the Fairness/Cheating module can be expressed in two different modes. 
In some instances, and for some people, fairness is distribution according to what they de-
serve, usually by their efforts. In other instances, and for some other people, fairness is dis-
tribution through roughly equal division. HAIDT, supra note 7, at 138. 
43  Egocentric bias, leading to optimistic overconfidence in a good future, is a common fea-
ture of human decision-making. Various sources are collected in RANDALL KISER, BEYOND 
RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND 
CLIENTS 124–26 (2010). Here, we see how egocentric bias can be fueled by intuitive moral 
judgment. 
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their autonomy and status, should moderate whatever negative moral judgments 
they are experiencing in their conflict. At the same time, a mediator would like 
the parties to employ the same methods with each other, finding points of affil-
iation, and showing respect for the autonomy and status of each, including both 
parties and lawyers.44 
A failed purchase of a house in Malibu: Negotiation scholar Michael 
Wheeler tells the story of how Arvind Gupta lost the opportunity to buy an ex-
pensive house at a very low price.45 When some childless friends of his were 
confronted with a huge unexpected real estate tax bill for their house in Malibu, 
they decided to downsize and offered Gupta the house at a bargain price. Since 
the house was in Malibu, Gupta needed financial assistance to purchase it, even 
at the low price, and he sought out a wealthy friend to invest. The friend sug-
gested offering a lower price, to test the bargaining waters, a sensible sugges-
tion, both to learn the firmness of the owners’ offer and to avoid the regret of 
feeling one has paid too much. Gupta did so. But the counteroffer offended the 
homeowners, who then withdrew the offer.46 According to Wheeler, the home-
owners told Gupta, “We treated you like a son, and this is how you thank us?”47 
The homeowners’ reaction can be understood as their moral judgment that 
Gupta had been disloyal to them, acting on the wrong pole of the loyal-
ty/betrayal moral module. 
C. Implications of these Stories 
The foregoing review of examples of moral modules has featured loyal-
ty/betrayal, with a nod to authority/subversion in Roger Fisher’s and Daniel 
Shapiro’s precepts about negotiating. I have not set out many examples of fair-
ness/cheating; I assume it is widely accepted that claims of cheating appear fre-
quently in negotiations and mediations. Such moral judgments most likely play 
a meaningful role in many contracts disputes, in which one party feels that they 
have been cheated by the false promises of another, or by one party’s failure to 
keep the promises they have made. Similarly, it is easy to understand that peo-
ple in conflict feel they have been hurt, and that their opponent has committed 
the moral wrong of hurting rather than caring for them. Arguments about cau-
sation and damages in torts cases can often be mapped to moral claims about 
who did the hurt. The degree of hurt and compensation can similarly carry 
moral freight: the defendant’s settlement offer, if any, may be seen by the 
plaintiff to insufficiently acknowledge the degree of hurt, and, conversely, the 
plaintiff’s demand may be seen by the defendant as seeking undeserved com-
                                                        
44  Showing appreciation for the others’ participation in the process—the fourth Fish-
er/Shapiro precept—would not hurt, either. 
45  MICHAEL WHEELER, THE ART OF NEGOTIATION: HOW TO IMPROVISE AGREEMENT IN A 
CHAOTIC WORLD 21–22 (2013). 
46  The house sold a year later for almost five times the price that had been offered to Gupta. 
Id. at 22. 
47  Id. 
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pensation—a form of cheating. A test for MFT lies in whether we can identify 
the other modules in mediated or negotiated conflicts, as well. Thus, I have 
tried to identify examples of loyalty/betrayal at work.48 
But what about authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation, or liber-
ty/oppression? If MFT is correct, and if intuitive moral judgment pervades hu-
man relations and conflict situations, then shouldn’t we see examples of those 
modules, as well? 
I find aspects of both authority/subversion and loyalty/betrayal in the Wil-
son and DiLorenzo matter. Frank was the head of his company, and thus, he 
had authority over Connie and Sam, the employees who had contributed to the 
situation. In standing up for them, he was showing a proper exercise of authori-
ty, as well as loyalty, to his employees. This might not be immediately apparent 
until we understand “authority” in a broader sense than simply the power to 
command obedience. Haidt derives the MFT concept of authority from the 
work of anthropologist Alan Fiske.49 Fiske has proposed that all social relation-
ships fall into one of five categories, one of which is authority ranking.50 In au-
thority ranking, the person with higher ranking does not have carte blanche to 
do whatever he or she wants to the other. Authority carries with it some obliga-
tion to care for the subordinate. When the authority end of authority/subversion 
is understood this way, it includes some concern and responsibility for the sub-
ordinates. Frank voiced this concern and responsibility for Connie and Sam, 
which elicited a positive response from Bernice. 
I think we would be most likely to find the authority/subversion module 
flaring up in employment disputes, particularly between supervisors and subor-
dinates, as in the mediation story of the former marine,51 but it might also oper-
ate with some force in family disputes, conflicts between business partners, and 
even schoolyard conflicts, where there is disagreement over how much authori-
ty one person should properly exercise over another. Some medical or other 
professional malpractice disputes might elicit authority/subversion issues; the 
professional might feel morally affronted by having his or her professional 
judgment subverted by the client’s or patient’s claim. Conversely, a client or 
patient who has been injured by professional malpractice might intuit the moral 
                                                        
48  A skeptic might point out many examples I’ve cited—Wilson and DiLorenzo, Gladwell’s 
British mediation, the bike shop, the Malibu house—involve family or family-like relation-
ships. Perhaps the moral judgment at issue is not Loyalty/Betrayal at all, but simply “fami-
ly.” A defender of Moral Foundations Theory might respond that family is one of the places 
where Loyalty/Betrayal is most prominent, but that does not make “family” a foundational 
moral category. Instead, family is a specific articulation of a more fundamental intuitive 
moral judgment that also exhibits itself in patriotism, team spirit, and similar situations. 
49  HAIDT, supra note 7, at 144 (“The Authority foundation . . . is borrowed directly from 
Fiske.”). 
50  The others are community sharing, equality matching, market pricing, and a null category 
of the imposition of raw force. FISKE, supra note 21, at 3–4. 
51  See supra text accompanying note 31. 
Spring 2015] BEYOND FAIRNESS 977 
mistake made by the professional who abused his or her authority by not taking 
proper care. 
Sanctity/degradation seems less familiar in mediation and negotiation sit-
uations. These moral issues cluster around matters of religion, sex, cleanliness, 
and food.52 Some conflicts, such as those between divorcing parents over the 
proper religious affiliation for their children, may present a perceived threat to 
sanctity, which would give extra force to the parties’ opposing views. In some 
other conflicts, something about the other disputant, rather than the matter in 
dispute itself, might elicit this moral module. A white person might feel extra 
antipathy dealing with a person of color.53 The mediation story of the 
transgendered neighbor, described above, seems to fall into this category.54 
Even a conflict with someone deemed to be slovenly, or to smell bad, might 
give rise to an intuitive moral rejection. 
Of course, a handful of incomplete and suggestive examples, some of 
which are not even real disputes, proves nothing. But they fit well enough for 
me to continue exploring the operating hypothesis that MFT accounts for the 
extensive, perhaps even universal, role of moral judgment in mediation and ne-
gotiation. 
III. CRITIQUES OF MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY 
A. Has MFT Established an Identifiable, Limited Number of Modules? 
The idea of moral modules, and a limited number of them, is critical to 
MFT and to the project of understanding intuitive moral judgment in negotia-
tion and mediation. Without either the concept of modules—functionally dis-
tinct areas of concern and reaction—or a limited number, we would need to ad-
dress moral judgments either in terms of the widely variable specifics of each 
participant or seek to find some more general, universal moral principles, such 
as fairness or empathy. Philosophers Christopher Suhler and Patricia Church-
land have challenged MFT on the following three grounds: “modules” remain 
an unsubstantiated account of how the mind actually works; MFT’s articulation 
of five (now six) particular moral modules has an arbitrary character, that is not 
well supported by empirical evidence; and the MFT concept does not match 
well with what neuroscience tells us about how the brain actually functions.55 
                                                        
52  Tying the moral modules to evolution, Haidt notes that this module seems rooted in intui-
tive disgust with rotten or otherwise dangerous food, which has the obvious virtue of keep-
ing people healthier. HAIDT, supra note 7, at 146–48. 
53  The discomfort may not require explicit racism. The Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) 
tells us that many people have unconscious bias. JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, 
REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 51–53 (2013). 
54  See supra text accompanying note 32. 
55  Christopher L. Suhler & Patricia Churchland, Can Innate, Modular “Foundations” Ex-
plain Morality? Challenges for Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory, 23 J. COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE 2103, 2103 (2011). 
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While Haidt has a vigorous and well-stated rejoinder, attributing the critique in 
part to different degrees of preference for the extent of empirical support need-
ed for a conceptual theory,56 the challenge to the idea of mental modules and 
the apparent flexibility in identifying and naming modules does create concern. 
I will discuss the question of the number of mental modules below.57 But if the 
idea of mental modules itself is not supportable, then the effort to identify and 
manage moral judgments in negotiation and mediation will be much more dif-
ficult. 
For purposes of this article, I accept Haidt’s account of moral modules, de-
spite the possible weaknesses of the concept of mental modules in general.58 
My purpose is to explore whether Haidt’s account is useful for negotiation and 
mediation, and for that task I can remain open minded about the reality of men-
tal modules. A weakness in the concept of mental modules might help explain 
why I found it relatively easy to identify MFT’s modules in a variety of negoti-
ation and mediation situations.59 In articulating the modules, Haidt and his col-
leagues have drawn on very familiar and evocative words, such as care, betray-
al, subversion, and disgust. Because those words are so powerful, they can 
easily seem explanatory when we come to apply them to specific disputes. 
They may be floating free of any empirical mooring, a risk that is magnified if 
they have little or no empirical basis to begin with. But even with that caveat, I 
would still like to try to give more shape and name to the moral dimensions of 
negotiation and mediation. 
B. Are the Moral Modules Innate or Learned? Are They Universal or 
Culturally and Individually Variable? 
MFT has been subject to the objection that it is culturally specific rather 
than universal. Most of the studies on which it is based rely on WEIRD people, 
an acronym coined by the psychologists Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and 
Ara Norenzayan to refer to people from “Western, Educated, Industrialized, 
Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies.”60 Haidt acknowledges the cultural 
limitations of much of the study data, but he and his colleagues have conducted 
studies in other countries and other cultures.61 Even if the modules are not truly 
universal, they can still be quite useful to a mediator. For the most part, Ameri-
                                                        
56  Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph, How Moral Foundations Theory Succeeded in Building 
on Sand: A Response to Suhler and Churchland, 23 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 2117, 2118 
(2011). 
57  See infra Part III.E. 
58  Suhler and Churchland note that brain studies show us that the brain operates through a 
very rich pattern of connections, in a “loop[ing]” kind of fashion, rather than limiting func-
tion to particular areas that might form a physical basis for “modules.” Suhler & Churchland, 
supra note 55, at 2109. 
59  See supra Part II. 
60  Joseph Henrich et al., The Weirdest People in the World?, 33 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 
61, 61 (2010). 
61  Graham et al., supra note 7, at 92–93. 
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can mediators work in a WEIRD society with WEIRD people; findings related 
to such people will help the mediators who work with them. 
Of more concern is Haidt’s own finding that the constellation of moral 
modules varies between people of different political views. People who are po-
litically liberal tend to be concerned with issues of care/harm and fair-
ness/cheating, and less attentive to issues of loyalty/betrayal, authori-
ty/subversion, or sanctity/degradation.62 Political conservatives, by contrast, 
tend to be concerned about all of these moral modules in more equal degree.63 
This variability suggests that even if the modules are innate, they may some-
how become enhanced or minimized through a person’s growth and experi-
ence.64 
These findings, based on tendencies across large groups of respondents, 
should not lead a mediator or negotiator to draw conclusions about pertinent 
moral issues simply by learning the political leanings of their mediation partic-
ipants. Some politically liberal people may respond to matters of authority or 
loyalty quite vigorously, even if the majority of them do not, and much may 
depend on the particular circumstances in which the salient issues arose. Little 
concern with authority in a formal institutional setting, such as a large corpora-
tion, may change to much more concern for the proper respect for authority 
within someone’s family, for instance. Any correlation between political views 
and moral judgments is by no means universal across groups or across all con-
flict situations. 
More importantly, variability means that mediators should not assume that 
all people they deal with will experience the same moral judgments with simi-
lar intensity. For some, cheating and harm may loom particularly large, while 
betrayal or subversion simply do not elicit much reaction. For others, attending 
only to fairness and caring may not remove the moral sting from the situation. 
They may need to deal with the felt immorality of betrayal or subversion, or 
may need a dose of loyalty or authority to make moving forward morally ac-
ceptable. 
C. Were the Moral Modules Formed by Evolution? 
Critics challenge Haidt’s claim that the moral modules have evolved with 
the human species, binding human communities and vastly increasing man-
kind’s opportunities for successful cooperative action.65 Proof of evolutionary 
function is often weak and contested, since it depends on much inference about 
the past with almost no directly observable data. If we cannot show that the 
                                                        
62  See Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives 
Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals May Not Recognize, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 98, 99 (2007). 
63  Id. 
64  HAIDT, supra note 7, at 130. 
65  See, e.g., Moses L. Pava, The Exaggerated Moral Claims of Evolutionary Psychologists, 
85 J. BUS. ETHICS 391, 398–99 (2009) (discussing criticisms). 
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moral modules serve an evolutionary, beneficial function, then Haidt’s claim 
that the moral modules are built into human functioning and are foundational 
becomes correspondingly weakened. 
The evolutionary explanation, however, is not necessary to make MFT use-
ful for contemporary mediators or negotiators. The moral frameworks might be 
foundational for people here and now, even if they did not develop through 
evolution to improve social cohesion and cooperation. If they are foundational, 
then a mediator has some guidance for how to understand the moral dynamics 
of the conflict. Even without the evolutionary origins account, we can credit the 
research of Haidt and others identifying a discrete and limited set of moral 
modules. We can then feel moderately confident using that set. 
D. How Strong is the Empirical Evidence for MFT? 
Haidt developed the theory from questionnaires using odd-sounding and 
troubling scenarios, such as eating one’s pet dog or slapping one’s father.66 The 
questions might seem too troubling and unusual to justify the creation of an en-
tire theory of mental functioning, particularly one with such a fully articulated 
and multi-part structure. Nevertheless, Haidt and his colleagues have kept at it, 
and researchers have made findings using other methods, including studies of 
brain activity using fMRI machines, that are at least consistent with the theo-
ry.67 Haidt candidly admits that the theory is a work in process, and subject to 
revision as the empirical evidence develops.68 
E. Are There Only Five or Six Moral Modules? 
Haidt remains open-minded on whether there are only five or six founda-
tional moral modules. He notes that further research might identify more, or 
fewer.69 The tentative nature of the list should give us some pause in applying 
MFT. If it turns out that there are more, then a mediator or negotiator might be 
unwise to limit the discussion if she were to focus only on those that Haidt has 
                                                        
66  See, for example, the questionnaire set out in The Righteous Mind asking the respondents, 
in part, how much they would need to be paid to either “1a. Stick a sterile hypodermic nee-
dle into your arm,” or “1b. Stick a sterile hypodermic needle into the arm of a child you 
don’t know.” HAIDT, supra note 7, at 129. The different dollar amounts demanded reveal 
different moral judgments for similar actions, depending on the moral module elicited by the 
question. 
67  Graham et al., supra note 7, at 73, 97. 
68  E.g., id. at 71. 
69  Id. at 104. Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and her colleagues present a model that has six distinct 
attributes. Ronnie Janoff-Bulman & Nate C. Carnes, Surveying the Moral Landscape: Moral 
Motives and Group-Based Moralities, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 219, 221–22 
(2013). Tage Shakti Rai and Alan Page Fiske argue that intuitive moral judgments should be 
understood in terms of the underlying (and finite) structure of human relationships, and not 
as disconnected from relationships as Haidt would have them. Tage Shakti Rai & Alan Page 
Fiske, Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation: Moral Motives for Unity, Hierarchy, 
Equality, and Proportionality, 118 PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 57–58 (2011). 
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identified so far. At the same time, many more equally fundamental modules 
would deprive MFT of much of its usefulness as a way to avoid an unmanagea-
ble flood of possible moral issues. 
F. Can We Identify the Moral Modules in the Wild? 
Identifying moral modules in the tightly controlled settings of question-
naires, neuroscience experiments, or even close readings of texts is a far cry 
from seeing them operate in the free-flowing, poorly structured, multifaceted 
setting of a negotiation or mediation. Real life settings create a substantial risk 
of false diagnosis. The risk is made worse by the fact that MFT uses familiar 
but highly charged words to describe the modules. If a party to a dispute alleges 
“cheating,” is it because she understands her counterpart to have violated the 
moral standards of the fairness/cheating module, or only because that was the 
word available to her when what she was really experiencing was harm and be-
trayal? Or, if she says she is “disgusted” by the way the other has “betrayed” 
her by flouting her “authority,” how can we tell which module or modules lie 
behind her view of the conflict? Perhaps we could become more confident 
about the module or modules in play by asking her to talk more about the situa-
tion and her view of it. Or perhaps the context in which the words were said—
after a particularly hostile verbal barrage from the other, for instance—might 
help us judge when not to take the module-specific words as indications that 
the speaker is making the moral judgment supposedly indicated by those words. 
MFT has proposed no way for ordinary practitioners to understand the words 
with technical precision in live situations. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIATORS AND NEGOTIATORS 
A. Should Mediators and Negotiators Care about Intuitive Moral Judgments? 
The importance of MFT for mediation and negotiation depends on how we 
understand the moral modules to operate in the mind. May they safely be ig-
nored if no one mentions them? Or, to the contrary, must they always be at-
tended to, even when no one has voiced moral claims or moral judgments, such 
as in a mediation that focuses entirely on competing monetary settlement posi-
tions? Do they only operate in certain circumstances? We do not know the an-
swers to these questions, but our assumptions about them will have an im-
portant impact on what we do. 
At one extreme, we might think that the moral judgments made by the 
moral modules simply do not exist unless and until they become part of some-
one’s conscious awareness or palpable feeling. If moral judgments are primari-
ly matters of reasoning, they must be explicitly articulated, even if only in 
one’s private thoughts, to count as moral judgments. We could expand this 
view of the operation of moral judgments to encompass feelings, as well. 
Someone might not have an explicit, conscious thought about the rightness or 
982 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:959  
wrongness of some act or situation, but might feel angry, sad, or troubled by it. 
The feeling might have been elicited by a moral judgment, even if the moral 
judgment only remains a vague sense that something is right or wrong. In either 
event, under this explicit view, the moral judgment cannot be properly said to 
exist, or to have any effect on thought or action, unless the person making the 
judgment perceives it some way. 
At the other extreme, we might understand that the mind is continually but 
unconsciously assessing the moral situation along all the moral modules, even 
when a person remains totally unaware of them.70 Just as we can safely drive a 
car while thinking about what to have for dinner, leaving it to our unconscious 
mental processing to guide the car and avoid danger, perhaps we can discuss all 
sorts of things in a negotiation or mediation without being aware of any moral 
dynamics. In the example of driving, when something unusual or dangerous is 
unconsciously perceived, the appropriate thoughts and feelings leap into con-
scious thought and the driver acts accordingly. Perhaps the moral modules 
work the same way: the mind constantly inventories the people and actions 
with whom one is dealing, raising a moral alarm to palpable feeling or con-
scious thought only when something unusual or threatening appears. 
Intuitive moral judgment might act in some way between these two ex-
tremes. It might operate for the most part unconsciously, but not continually. 
We would then want to understand more fully when and how it might start to 
operate unconsciously and how it might affect thought and action. For instance, 
intuitive moral judgments might be “primed” by words or actions, images or 
memories. In the psychological phenomenon of priming, people are uncon-
sciously influenced to have certain thoughts, experience certain feelings, or 
take certain actions by the priming agent.71 In one famous experiment, people 
who had first been given warm drinks were more likely to characterize some-
one they read about as “warm.”72 In another, people who had, as instructed, re-
called an ethically questionable deed, were more likely to take an antiseptic 
wipe to clean their hands.73 Intuitive moral judgments might spring to uncon-
scious life when primed, and have some effect on thought and action even 
when not explicitly articulated, recognized, or felt by someone. 
I do not have a confident opinion about which of these accounts, if any, 
best describes how our moral judgment works. The most rational approach—
moral judgments do not count as such and need not be considered unless they 
                                                        
70  Recent research suggests that unconscious moral judgment even affects how and what 
people notice, not only how they make decisions. See, e.g., Ana P. Gantman & Jay J. Van 
Bavel, Moral Perception, 19 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. (forthcoming Aug. 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2647767. 
71  KAHNEMAN, supra note 24, at 52–58. 
72  Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Inter-
personal Warmth, 322 SCIENCE 606, 607 (2008). 
73  This has been termed the “Macbeth” effect. Chen-Bo Zhong & Katie Liljenquist, Washing 
Away Your Sins: Threatened Morality and Physical Cleansing, 313 SCIENCE 1451, 1452 and 
erratum posted Oct. 13, 2006 (erratum not changing the pertinent conclusion). 
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are explicitly thought or felt—is, of the three, most at odds with the psycholog-
ical account of the “new unconscious.”74 At the other extreme, if would be dif-
ficult to demonstrate that our minds are continually making unperceived moral 
assessments along the five or six moral modules, since, by definition, most of 
that important mental functioning throws off no explicit or conscious markers. 
Nevertheless, we can speculate on the implications of each for a mediator or 
negotiator. 
The explicit model of moral judgment presents the least concern for a me-
diator or negotiator. Unless a disputant says something with moral meaning, or 
expresses a feeling that seems closely linked to a moral judgment, we can pret-
ty safely assume that the moral modules articulated by MFT are not operating 
or influencing the disputant’s decision-making. One must be cautious with such 
a judgment, however, even in the explicit model. A participant might be think-
ing a moral thought, or feeling an emotion linked to a moral judgment, without 
obviously expressing it to a mediator or negotiator. There are myriad reasons 
why someone might censor their own thoughts or feelings, such as a sense that 
they are inappropriate for the situation, or perhaps are a cause for shame or em-
barrassment, or would expose a weakness that another could take advantage of, 
and so on.75 The participant might have a briefly passing thought along these 
lines, or a sudden but temporary feeling, and then put them aside without their 
becoming part of the mediation or negotiation. A mediator or negotiator who 
wants to recognize and deal with moral judgments that appear in this way 
should remain attentive to these brief appearances, and should use the standard 
methods of good interviewing to make sure they are learning what the partici-
pants are actually thinking and feeling.76 
But under this mental model, a mediator or negotiator could choose to ig-
nore the moral thought or feeling with at least a moderate sense of assurance. 
Once the thought or feeling has passed, under the explicit or rational approach, 
it no longer operates to affect further thought or action. In the Wilson-
DiLorenzo mediation example, the mediator heard Frank mention “loyalty.” 
She might have let that pass, and the matter might have moved on without the 
moral issue of loyalty playing a part. Instead, she reiterated the word, kept 
Frank’s attention on it, and even suggested that it might help his negotiation 
with Bernice. And so it turned out to be.77 
If, however, moral judgments and associated feelings operate more persis-
tently in an unconscious way, either in the constant or priming models de-
                                                        
74  See generally TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE 
ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002); Haidt, The Emotional Dog, supra note 23, at 814–15. 
75  DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 19–
26 (3d ed. 2012) (listing inhibitors to disclosure in interviewing situations). 
76  Id. at 46–63. 
77  Mediator Cutrona to DiLorenzo in private caucus: “I think the fact that you are so loyal to 
[Connie and Sam], that they have been long-term employees speaks well for you. I don’t un-
derstand you [sic] hesitancy in terms of telling [Bernice] that.” FRENKEL & STARK, 
TEACHER’S MANUAL, supra note 8, at E-38. 
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scribed above, mediators and negotiators would ignore them at greater peril. 
They will not disappear simply by the failure to explicitly think or talk about 
them. Even if Frank never voiced his thoughts about his loyalty to Connie and 
Sam, or they were dropped from the conversation after a brief mention, his 
thinking and feeling would still be affected by his sense that it was morally 
right to remain loyal to them. We cannot predict for sure what the effect would 
be, but it would likely make him less willing to acknowledge the bad things 
that had happened to Bernice, or to make concessions to her, since both of 
those might mean turning away from his loyalty to them. 
This is where MFT has consequence for mediation and negotiation. It tells 
us that moral modules most likely operate in a pervasive or priming manner. 
After all, the moral modules arise, intuitively, automatically, quickly, and ef-
fortlessly. Explicit, rational thought plays a minor role, meaning that moral 
modules will have an effect even if no one discusses them or pays explicit at-
tention to them. By making the moral issue of loyalty an explicit part of the 
conversation, Cheryl Cutrona, the mediator, tried to exert more intentional con-
trol over it, rather than letting it silently affect the course of the mediation. 
B. How Can Mediators and Negotiators Discover the Moral Modules? 
If moral modules operate pervasively or by priming, how can a mediator, 
or even a participant for that matter, know whether specific modules are influ-
encing thought and action? By definition, people make their moral judgments 
without necessarily being aware of what is going on. The most apparent way is 
to listen, but listening is not simple. One could just attend to words or stories 
that are particularly indicative of a moral judgment, or associated with one of 
the modules—words about fairness, harm, disloyalty, and lack of respect might 
all be good clues. Similarly, a display of feelings such as anger, fear, or disgust, 
even if only fleeting, might indicate some unstated moral judgments. 
Having heard such words or seen such displays of feeling, a mediator 
might then seek to learn more about the moral story the speaker might be trying 
to tell. The least intrusive way to learn would be simply to articulate or reflect 
back the words or feelings he or she heard or saw. Such reflection could signal 
to the speaker that the words and feelings were appropriate, and the speaker 
might then go further with them.78 
But a mediator (or a listening negotiator) could also go further, suggesting 
words or naming feelings to see whether they elicit a fuller moral account from 
the speaker. The benefit of such an approach is that it would disclose an intui-
tive reaction that might otherwise remain hidden but still affect the discussion. 
The danger, however, is that the mediator’s or negotiator’s own statements 
could prime a moral judgment that would otherwise not exist or have any im-
pact. In this instance, it makes a difference whether moral modules are continu-
                                                        
78  BINDER ET AL., supra note 75, at 46–55 (describing the techniques of reflective or active 
listening). 
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ally working unconsciously in the listener, or whether they only become a fac-
tor if primed in some manner. 
Moral judgment priming may also occur for reasons other than a media-
tor’s or negotiator’s intervention. Many statements or events in a mediation or 
negotiation could elicit an intuitive and unconscious moral judgment. A person 
in a conflict may have made moral judgments or had associated feelings at 
some point during the conflict, even if only fleetingly and not fully articulated 
or realized. Having had the previous experience, the judgments and feelings 
might be more readily accessible, and have a greater potential for an impact, 
than if they had never crossed the person’s mind initially. If that is so, then the 
priming might be something out of the mediator’s or negotiator’s control. He or 
she could remain alert to whether the discussion seems to elicit words, feelings, 
or actions that have a moral connotation, without directly injecting a moral is-
sue that was not already inchoate. 
C. Should Mediators and Negotiators Use a Variety of Moral Modules? 
If moral judgments are as pervasive and ungovernable as MFT suggests, 
then mediators are faced with a substantial dilemma. They need to address the 
moral judgments that may be hindering a good process and a good resolution. 
Equally important, it would be useful to harness moral judgments that could 
improve process and outcome. But any actions to engage with the participants’ 
moral judgments may collide with party autonomy and self-determination. 
Honoring participants’ autonomy and self-determination is a cardinal ethical 
principle for mediators.79 People own their moral judgments, and it is highly 
intrusive to try to get them to change, or even to raise questions about their 
moral judgments. 
Of course, if we take the view that moral judgments do not operate in a 
mediation setting unless the participants explicitly recognize and articulate 
them—the conscious-processing model of moral judgment—the mediator’s di-
lemma is ameliorated: simply stay away from whatever moral judgments are 
expressed. At most, a mediator might respond if a participant accuses her of 
operating an unfair mediation process, such as “cheating” on the promise of 
equal treatment by not giving the participants equal time or respect. It does not 
undermine respect for a participant’s autonomy for a mediator to respond di-
rectly to an explicit claim that the mediator did something wrong.80 
The troublesome quality of MFT lies in the fact that, under its account, 
moral judgments cannot be limited to those that are explicitly articulated. They 
pervade without being explicitly mentioned. A mediator or negotiator cannot be 
                                                        
79  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005) 
(Standard I: Self Determination, “A. A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the 
principle of party self-determination.”). 
80  Some mediators might choose to respond less directly, merely summarizing and reflecting 
back what the participant said, and then let the process go forward. 
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confident that they do not exist, or have no effect, simply because no party 
makes an explicit moral claim. Mediators should seek to understand and deal 
with unstated assumptions and views that might be affecting the mediation. 
Does that sound too intrusive? It would not be intrusive to question mistakes of 
fact, such as a math error in calculating the amount of a demand, or to question 
the participants’ unrealistic, wishful predictions that a court will award them 
everything they want. It would also be appropriate to explore and question a 
participant’s mistaken belief about the negotiation process itself; they might 
suffer from an unrealistic expectation that their opponents will “cave in” so 
long as they remain “tough” and yield no positional ground. Further, it would 
not be intrusive for a mediator to explore whether a participant is making these 
kinds of mistakes, even if they have not been explicitly articulated. Each of 
these mistakes, stated or not, hinders the search for a good resolution. Good ne-
gotiation and mediation should expose this kind of error, and encourage the 
participants to adjust their thoughts and actions accordingly. 
Intuitive, unexamined, and unarticulated moral judgments can thwart the 
search for a good resolution in the same way as factual mistakes or biased 
judgments. Cass Sunstein has likened intuitive moral judgments to decision-
making “heuristics,” the mental shortcuts and biases we use to address many of 
the issues that face us.81 Often, those heuristics provide an effective way to 
make a decision without an unnecessary use of mental energy and time. Some-
times, however, they skew judgment and prevent good decisions. A good nego-
tiator or mediator should step in to counteract their effect. But moral judgments 
seem to form part of a person’s being in a way that facts and predictions do not. 
Trying to “correct” them raises ethical concerns, particularly for a mediator, 
that correcting bad math or bad predictions does not. In terms of moral judg-
ments, one might argue that negotiators and mediators should leave participants 
as they find them.82 
Regardless of one’s view on the need to leave moral judgments alone, me-
diators still have options that might alleviate the participants’ judgmental ob-
stacles to good mediation. As noted above,83 the nature of an articulated moral 
claim might be ambiguous or misleading, and a mediator could at least try to 
clarify it. For instance, a participant who says that some act or settlement pro-
posal is “unfair” might be speaking from a fairness/cheating module, accusing 
the other party of cheating in some way. The statement of “unfair” might have 
another moral module meaning, though, such as the other person being harmful 
and insufficiently caring, or subversive of the speaker’s authority, or disloyal in 
                                                        
81  Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 405, 432–33 
(2009). 
82  Opinions may differ on how cautious a mediator might be in this regard. My colleague 
Kenneth Kressel, an experienced mediator and mediation scholar, would feel comfortable 
with a more direct engagement with a participant’s moral views, making them part of the 
mediator’s work. Email on file with the author. 
83  See supra Part IV.A. 
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some way. Without debating whether the accused actually acted unfairly, a me-
diator might ask the speaker to talk more about the expressed moral judgment, 
to see if the judgment is really of a different kind. Clarifying the nature of the 
moral claim might create opportunities for more fruitful discussion. An oppo-
nent who bristles at being labeled a “cheater,” for instance, might not be so of-
fended by an accusation of disloyalty. Then, if it turns out that disloyalty more 
accurately states what the speaker was feeling, the opponent might be more 
willing to engage in a discussion of how to solve the matter. 
The pluralist nature of MFT is useful because it can reveal ways to see 
even morally troublesome opponents in a morally better light, as happened in 
the Wilson-DiLorenzo matter. Craig Lord handled the mediation simply as a 
matter of compromising the parties’ competing claims, in light of the law, the 
provable facts, and what one should expect from a trial. The salient moral issue 
in his handling of the mediation was how bad a cheater Frank was: Why did he 
install cabinet “seconds”? Was it because he did not care for Bernice, and 
sought to unfairly cheat her out of what he had promised? Or was it standard in 
the industry to install that kind of cabinet?84 Was his work stoppage justified by 
delays in getting parts? Or was he acting in his own self-interest in a way that 
hurt Bernice? Lord did not have the parties engage in the moral dimensions of 
these events, or change the moral judgments they might have about each other. 
He instead focused the discussion on industry standard and the risks each faced 
at trial. In Cheryl Cutrona’s mediation, however, a different moral module—
Frank’s loyalty to his employees—also became part of the discussion, allowing 
Bernice to trust Frank more without having to change her view that he had been 
wrong to stop work and ignore her.85 
Discussion about the moral claim may, in some instances, moderate the 
moral judgment itself, even without shifting focus to a different module. When 
asked to describe in more detail how and why an opponent is a cheat, for in-
stance, a speaker may realize that their claim is not logically coherent, or rests 
on assumptions that do not seem so correct once articulated. But we should not 
be optimistic that talk and explanation will lead someone to change their moral 
judgment. Haidt notes that intuitive moral judgments—that is to say most moral 
judgments—are quite resistant to reason. Indeed, most of what passes for moral 
“reasoning” is actually nothing more than rationalization of conclusions already 
embraced.86 
                                                        
84  DiLorenzo to mediator Lord: “The cabinets are the cabinets that we always use. They are 
irregular; that is why we are able to buy them—but they are sound . . . .” FRENKEL & STARK, 
TEACHER’S MANUAL, supra note 8, at E-18. 
85  Focusing on someone’s morally positive actions, as a way to ameliorate the effect of neg-
ative moral judgments, is a kind of polar opposite from using guilt to try to change a partici-
pant’s decision. See Stark & Frenkel, supra note 18, at 325 (describing how mediators might 
elicit participants’ feelings of guilt to induce the participants to change their negotiating po-
sitions, but with the risk that feelings of guilt that are too strong might produce anger and 
resistance from the participants). 
86  E.g., HAIDT, supra note 7, at 87. 
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Negotiators need not be as concerned as mediators with the autonomy and 
self-determination of the others they are dealing with. Negotiators must serve 
their own interests, and the interests of their principals or clients, if they are ne-
gotiating for another. When these interests conflict with those of their negotiat-
ing counterparts, a high degree of influence or even manipulation of the other 
may be justified. There are both practical and moral reasons, though, for even a 
negotiator to be concerned with autonomy and self-determination of their coun-
terparts. Such attention can elicit a greater willingness to agree.87 And treating 
the other as an end, and not just as a means to satisfy one’s own interests, is 
morally good.88 Of course, all of this must still be done in the context of the 
need to serve one’s own or one’s principal’s interests as well. 
Once we understand moral modules as a plural phenomenon, however, we 
see that even a mediator has opportunities to engage with a participant’s moral 
judgments without disagreeing with them or trying to change them. Knowing 
that the participant most likely has moral judgments across a range of modules, 
a mediator or negotiator can look for places to avoid a direct conflict between a 
moral good and a moral bad. It may not be necessary to get a participant to 
abandon the view that their opponent did something morally wrong. Instead, 
one can look for instances of actions in a different moral module that are moral-
ly good. This is precisely what Cheryl Cutrona did in the Wilson-DiLorenzo 
matter. Rather than trying to get Bernice to think that Frank was not really as 
much of a cheat as she thought he was, she allowed Bernice to understand that 
Frank had taken a morally good path of showing loyalty to his business “fami-
ly.” 
D. Moral Foundations Theory and the Mediator’s Own Judgment 
MFT presents yet a further challenge to mediators—themselves. Mediator 
ethics require that a mediator remain impartial between the other participants.89 
But MFT tells us that mediators will probably be making intuitive moral judg-
ments about the participants, consciously or not. In the strong account of how 
the modules function, the mediator’s intuitive moral judgments will be influ-
encing his or her views and actions even if the mediator has no conscious 
thought or feeling about good or bad. Mediators may intuitively understand that 
one of the participants cheated, or demonstrated insufficient care, or was dis-
loyal in some way, and so on. Those understandings will most likely have some 
effect on what the mediator says and does, such as how hard to push for a com-
promise, whether particular terms seem “reasonable,” whether to focus more on 
                                                        
87  FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 36, at 74–75, 82–89. 
88  Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 739, 742–43 (2001). 
89  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N ET AL., supra note 79 (Standard II: Impartiality, “B. A mediator 
shall conduct a mediation in an impartial manner and avoid conduct that gives the appear-
ance of partiality.”). 
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making adjustments for future dealings, or simply get “closure” on the ongoing 
dispute and encourage the participants to move on to other things.90 
Moral judgments about the participants thus create a real risk that a media-
tor might not be treating the participants in an equal or even-handed manner. 
One might think that impartiality requires the avoidance of all moral judg-
ments. But MFT tells us that such avoidance is not possible. 
A mediator’s intuitive moral judgments will probably be less intense than 
those of the participants themselves. As has been pointed out,91 MFT primarily 
concerns interpersonal moral judgments, the kind people make about each oth-
er, not our thoughts and feelings about the morality of our own actions. Not 
having been in an interpersonal relationship with the parties, mediators will 
mostly only be observers of what was done. This distance to the conflict may 
reduce the intensity of their intuitive moral judgments, but it does not eliminate 
them altogether. MFT describes a rich web of judgments that bind societies; 
societies necessarily function by its people constantly assessing and judging 
each other from a moral perspective.92 
MFT does not give us an operating manual of when and how mediators, or 
anyone else, can set aside or counteract intuitive moral judgments through de-
liberation or rational moral thought. It only warns us that such control is less 
possible than we might like to believe. Nor do we have a clear account of 
whether or how a mediator’s or negotiator’s experience and expertise might 
disarm or sidestep intuitive moral judgments that would otherwise influence 
one’s thought and action. A mediator whose style focuses only on the partici-
pants’ negotiating leverage and legal strengths and weaknesses might, over 
time, come to be less affected by his or her own intuitions about cheating, 
harm, betrayal, or subversion of authority than a mediator who seeks to know 
more about the moral dimensions of the conflict. But we cannot be sure. A me-
diator’s own intuitive moral judgments about the participants might influence 
how he or she assesses the participants’ negotiating leverage and legal 
strengths; if a mediator intuitively judges one of the participants to have acted 
in a morally dubious way, he or she may simply not as readily see that partici-
pant’s negotiating leverage or the strengths of the case, or may not be as willing 
to search for novel ways to achieve a good resolution. Even if a mediator’s 
judgment is not subtly distorted by an unconscious moral judgment, his or her 
will and energy to keep working with a participant—and mediation often re-
                                                        
90  For a thoughtful and wise description of how mediators can recognize and respond to 
their automatic emotional reactions to the participants, see GARY FRIEDMAN, INSIDE OUT: 
HOW CONFLICT PROFESSIONALS CAN USE SELF-REFLECTION TO HELP THEIR CLIENTS (2015). 
Friedman does not explicitly refer to moral judgments or to Haidt’s moral modules, but in-
tuitive feelings are often linked to moral judgment. 
91  See Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, supra note 69, at 219; Ronnie Janoff-Bulman & Nate C. 
Carnes, Moral Context Matters: A Reply to Graham, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 
242, 242 (2013). 
92  Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 22, at 181. 
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quires an abundance of both—may flag in the face of some unstated moral 
doubts. 
Moreover, mediators who limit themselves to a narrow focus on negotiat-
ing leverage, legal strengths, and reciprocal compromises, for the sake of 
avoiding intuitive moral judgments would also be limiting the opportunities 
provided by mediation.93 Focusing only on positional compromises ignores the 
opportunities that mediation provides for creating more value for the partici-
pants, or helping them improve troubled relationships, or achieve greater mutu-
al understanding.94 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporary moral psychology provides a tool to examine certain dy-
namics of negotiation and mediation in a revealing light. The specifics of a dis-
pute—the dollars involved, the interests and needs lurking beneath the surface, 
the claims and denials of responsibility, the shape and progress of negotia-
tion—often seem accompanied by vaguely shaped issues of fairness and un-
fairness, and by the ebb and flow of feeling. Moral psychology, and in particu-
lar the branch known as MFT, sheds light on this shadow dimension. Using it, 
we can understand better why some negotiations break down and some media-
tions end with impasse. Also, it can help explain why some discussions focus 
entirely on the compromise of dollar claims, without encompassing other as-
pects of the situation, such as creating value by dovetailing the parties’ com-
plementary needs and interests, or dealing with difficult relationships and dis-
torted communication. 
MFT, as developed by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, proposes that 
people bring to every social interaction a finite set of intuitive moral modules, 
which constitute the foundations of their moral judgments and feelings about 
themselves and others. Rather than relying on some general sense of fairness, 
people respond to others by intuitively understanding whether the other is being 
fair or cheating, caring or harming, showing loyalty or betrayal, properly exer-
cising (or obeying) authority or subverting it, maintaining sanctity or eliciting 
disgust, or permitting liberty or imposing oppression. By attending to the pres-
ence of these moral reactions, in others and in themselves, participants in a ne-
                                                        
93  Such action would be toward the narrow end of the narrow-to-broad scale of possible me-
diator actions, as described by Leonard Riskin. Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Medi-
ation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2003). 
94  See Jonathan M. Hyman, Four Ways of Looking at a Lawsuit: How Lawyers Can Use the 
Cognitive Frameworks of Mediation, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 14–17 (2010) (describing 
how mediators can handle mediation through four different cognitive frameworks: positional 
compromise; creating more value by dovetailing complementary interests; dealing with rela-
tionship and communication problems; and fostering greater mutual understanding by the 
disputing parties. In each, the mediator provides benefits that are more difficult for the par-
ties and their lawyers to achieve through unmediated negotiation.). 
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gotiation or mediation can better manage the process of achieving a more satis-
factory outcome. 
Attention to the moral modules may affect a negotiation or mediation in a 
variety of ways. Simply bringing the moral judgment issues into explicit dis-
cussion may moderate a moral aversion that has caused the participants to resist 
any progress towards a solution. For instance, when the participants realize that 
one of them tends to see fairness in terms of equal distribution while the other 
tends to see fairness in terms of what is deserved, they may realize that they 
need to deal with both versions of fairness to reach an agreement. Similarly, a 
participant may mobilize the moral power of caring, not hurting, by demon-
strating that she is sincerely interested in trying to meet the needs of the other.95 
A participant may also elicit a positive reaction through loyalty—by finding a 
point of affiliation with her negotiation counterpart—or a positive reaction 
through authority—by acknowledging the counterpart’s authority to make a de-
cision.96 Articulating some morally positive actions of the participants, even 
those that are outside the parties’ treatment of each other, can ameliorate some 
of the moral aversion that enflames conflict and makes resolution difficult. 
At this point, the use of MFT to understand and guide mediations and ne-
gotiations is only an enticing suggestion. We have no demonstrable proof that 
the five or six moral modules proposed by Haidt apply in the field in some reg-
ular and predictable way. The studies used to develop the theory depend more 
on controlled experiments than on the ebb and flow of ordinary social interac-
tion. Even the number and nature of the foundational moral modules remains 
open to debate and revision. Nevertheless, the basic point of MFT—that intui-
tive and unconscious moral judgments form a constant background to our reac-
tions and decisions—tells us that we should not try to exclude an awareness of 
moral judgments from our negotiation and mediation practices. Instead, it pro-
vides ways to engage the moral dimensions of difference and conflict without 
stifling the opportunities for both creative problem solving and greater under-
standing that good negotiation and mediation can provide. 
                                                        
95  As we know from the work of Fisher and Ury, supra note 33, and many others, such as 
DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND 
SETTLEMENT 28–35 (3rd ed. 2004), it is often possible to care for and seek to meet the needs 
and interests of others without at the same time sacrificing one’s own needs and interests. 
96  See supra text accompanying notes 21, 25, 38, 47–48. 
